The real options literature has provided new insights on how to manage irreversible capital investments whose payoffs are always uncertain. Two of the most important predictions from such theory are: (i) greater risk delays a firm's investment timing, and (ii) greater risk increases the option value of waiting. This paper challenges such conclusions in a setting in which the relevant random variable is the arrival time of an unfavorable event. In addition, we avoid using stochastic calculus by introducing a novel framework in which a firm updates its beliefs about the profitability of an investment opportunity by waiting to invest.
INTRODUCTION
The real world is full of situations in which the main source of uncertainty regarding the value of an investment opportunity stems from the arrival date of a crucial event. For instance, let us consider in the first place a firm that has to choose the timing of investment in an R&D project whose outcome can be patented. In winner-takes-all industries, the time until discovery of the product or technology is clearly one of the most critical factors to take into account because of competitive forces. Yet, the time-to-discovery is usually unknown ex ante, so it is reasonable to assume that the relevant randomness of such R&D project largely stems from the uncertain discovery date, as well as those of competitors.
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In the second place, suppose that a firm has to make a decision about when to build a factory subject to a probable change in environmental or tax policy. As discussed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 304) , the date of policy change can be considered to be unknown to the firm and "it is commonly believed that expectations of shifts of policy can have powerful effects on decisions to invest."
In the last place, consider product launching decisions. In particular, let us suppose that a firm has to decide when to introduce a recently developed product under conditions of uncertainty about the future date at which a substitute product may be launched.
Competition of this product may entail the gradual decline in the demand of the product sold by the firm, and, consequently, randomness about the maturity date of the market would be an aspect that would critically affect the firm's launching decision.
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The real options literature has certainly been aware of the importance of these situations in which the date of occurrence of a key event is uncertain. Indeed, this explains 1 See Weeds (2002) for a formalization of such situation in a game-theoretic real options setting. the use of Poisson processes in real option valuation. Yet, while Poisson arrivals seem the correct way to model such phenomena, this modeling approach is not particularly suited to perform many analyses beyond real option pricing. For example, the effects of meanpreserving spreads on investment timing and option values cannot be determined. For this reason, the purpose of this paper is to reexamine some of the conclusions of the theory of real options in a fairly general setting in which all uncertainty refers to the arrival date of an unfavorable event that critically affects a firm's payoff.
3 To this end, we introduce a novel framework that is based on Bayesian updating: by simply waiting to invest, the firm can update its beliefs about the profitability of an investment opportunity. Moreover, our setup requires no stochastic calculus, which significantly reduces the difficulty of the model.
Furthermore, the firm's problem is amenable to an intuitive analysis in terms of marginality conditions linked to Bernanke's (1983) "bad news principle of irreversible investment."
The consideration of uncertain-date events yields that some of the fundamental results of the real options approach are not clear-cut. Firstly, the canonical real options model predicts that the value of an investment opportunity is non-decreasing in the variance parameter of the Geometric Brownian Motion that governs the return of the underlying asset. 4 Greater uncertainty cannot be harmful because the company always has the option to wait for better times or even not to invest should conditions turn out to be adverse. But, at the same time, the firm can capitalize on favorable market evolution and invest right on.
Therefore, there exists an asymmetry in that waiting to invest shields the firm against adverse realizations of uncertainty, but does not prevent it from taking advantage of 3 The date of occurrence of such event can be viewed to originate from a non-homogeneous Poisson process with a time-dependent arrival rate in which only the first event that occurs matters. 4 See, e.g., the classic paper by McDonald and Siegel (1986). favorable ones. This asymmetry, always present when there exist options whose payoffs are convex in the realization of the random variable, accounts for the non-negative effects of greater uncertainty on the value of investment opportunities. Notwithstanding, one of the contributions of our paper is to show that such asymmetry is not present when there exists uncertainty about the arrival date of an unfavorable event. In principle, in our setup, the event may occur before or after investing, but we show that the firm finds it optimal to undertake the investment only if uncertainty has not been resolved. Given this result and that the space of outcomes coincides with that of the control variable (namely, time), it follows that the firm would be insured against bad realizations because of waiting, and would take advantage of (very) good ones. However, it would be damaged by realizations shortly after the optimal time of investment. That is, if the event occurred right after investing, then the project may turn out to be unprofitable ex post, even though it might have seemed an excellent investment in expectation. As a result, more uncertainty may destroy option values, depending on whether the probability of occurrence of the event after the date of investment is increased by a sufficiently large amount.
Secondly, real options theory usually predicts that increased risk delays investment timing, a relevant aspect for both public policy and business purposes. Such conclusion basically follows from Bernanke's (1983) bad news principle. Intuitively, the benefit of waiting arises from the avoidance of making a poor investment when news is bad (i.e., when events are unfavorable). Given that only adverse events matter and a mean-preserving spread increases their probability of occurrence, the marginal benefit of delaying investment increases with uncertainty. Since the marginal opportunity cost of waiting (namely, current profits forgone) is unaffected by the spread, the net marginal benefit of deferring investment increases with uncertainty, which in turn induces a delay in entry. We show that this need not be true in our setting. More specifically, in our model only adverse events matter too.
Yet, the firm endogenously chooses whether to position itself in a situation in which a mean-preserving spread increases or decreases the conditional probability of immediate occurrence of the (bad) event, which explains why the conclusions may differ.
It is widely believed that real options theory predicts that greater risk depresses investment, and at the same time increases the value of an investment opportunity. These results can already be found in McDonald and Siegel (1986, p. 714) . Indeed, the prediction that more uncertainty leads to less investment appears to be supported by empirical evidence, as shown by Ferderer (1993) using aggregate data, or Leahy and Whited (1996) and Guiso and Parigi (1999) using micro data. These two last studies suggest that real options theory is the most solid theory of investment under uncertainty, which reinforces the need for a more comprehensive framework that helps to determine the factors and conditions that drive theoretical conclusions. Our work tries to be a step in this direction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3 solves it. Section 4 identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for an increase in risk to speed up investment, while Section 5 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the value of an investment opportunity to be a non-decreasing function of risk. Section 6 concludes. A mathematical appendix with all proofs is included at the end of the paper.
FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL
Let time, denoted by t, be a continuous variable, i.e. ). ,
Suppose that a risk-neutral firm -probably a monopolist-has to decide the instant at which it wants to enter a market by launching a product for which there already exist some potential buyers. Such decision is complicated by the existence of uncertainty about the temporal evolution of the market, which in turn affects the pattern of profit evolution. Uncertainty unravels partially over time, implying that the market (and, as a result, profit) evolves in the following manner. In a first stage, the profit flow, which is positive at date , 0  t grows over time. However, the market reaches its ephemeral maturity at an instant of time, where  is a continuous random variable with density ) ( f defined on ). , 0 [  (We will slightly abuse the notation and  will also denote its realization.) Hence, in a second phase whose beginning is unknown at date 0, instantaneous profit decreases over time and converges to 0 as   t , perhaps because consumers perceive that there is another product that can better serve their needs and choose to switch gradually. Formally, we assume the following:
Assumption 1: Given a realization  of the random maturity date, the flow of profits made by the firm if active in the market evolves continuously over time as follows: 5 It is straightforward to introduce different rates of growth and decay, or even more general functions for the growth and decline stages, but we choose not to do so to keep the model simple. Note also that we are implicitly assuming that operating costs are small enough, in order to avoid making exit an issue and focus only on entry timing. However, zero cost is not necessary for positive profits. For example, a sufficiently low marginal cost in a standard Hotelling model with a single firm located at one extreme would suffice, since costs would always be transferred to consumers, who in turn would be willing to pay a high price. We proceed now to characterize such optimal entry rule for the two possible states of the system, depending on whether the maturity date of the market has been revealed or not.
In the first place, it is clear that it is not optimal for the firm to exit at some date after having invested, given our assumptions of no scrap value and positive profit flow at any possible situation. This holds no matter if  is known or not. In turn, Lemma 1 below describes the firm's behavior once the maturity of the market has been reached. According to this result, the firm prefers to invest immediately once  is revealed, but only if such date is sufficiently large; otherwise, it prefers not to invest: 6 In the traditional real options framework, a parallel convergence condition requires the rate of expected growth of the investment to be smaller than the risk-free rate. 
Lemma 1: Immediate investment at the revealed maturity date  is optimal
can be easily shown to be continuously differentiable. Therefore, unlike conventional real options analysis, in which expected payoff functions depend on Ito processes and thereby are not differentiable in the classical sense, the firm's optimization program can be solved using standard differentiation techniques:
Before examining the firm's optimal decision rule when the market is growing, let us introduce some notation. In particular, let
denote the hazard rate, that is, the probability of the market immediately reaching its maturity at date t given that this event has not occurred previously. To ensure that )
is single-peaked, we also assume that the environment is such that ) (
which automatically holds if the density is decreasing. 8 We can now characterize the firm's optimal investment rule:
7 It is worth remarking that the optimal entry time to be derived will not change as time goes by and no event occurs. In particular, let ) ( 1 t t V be the value of the firm if it chooses to invest at 1 t (conditional on the market still expanding), given its current information at . 0  t Note that, conditional upon the cycle still growing at , t
coincides with that of
and there is no loss of generality in letting . 0  t Intuitively, at date 0 the firm already takes into account the underlying Bayesian updating process of which it can benefit just by delaying investment. As a result, it anticipates having better information at the time of entry if the market keeps on growing.
8 A decreasing density is implied by a non-increasing hazard rate in the prior distribution over market size, which appears to be empirically supported in the light of the work by Barbarino and Jovanovic (2004) . At a theoretical level, a decreasing hazard rate follows if the true hazard rate is constant but unknown to the firm, which can update its beliefs in a Bayesian fashion as time goes by (see, e.g, Choi 1991, footnote 9). Familiar probability distributions with non-increasing hazard rate and support ) , 0 [  (other than the exponential) 
The following result allows for an economic interpretation of the firm's optimal solution: an irreversible action. The latter value stems from the "bad news principle of irreversible investments," which can be found in Bernanke (1983) . According to this principle, the firm must only care about the bad news that may arrive in the next instant of time when deciding whether or not to undertake an irreversible project. 9 Thus, the firm believes there is some positive probability that the market may suddenly start declining right after time e t (this is include the gamma, log-logistic, Weibull and F distributions for certain values of the parameters that define them. However, neither the density nor the hazard rate need to be non-increasing for the assumption to hold.
For example, the density is decreasing even though the hazard rate is monotone increasing in Bass (1969) if
Additional examples of common random variables with non-monotonic densities that may satisfy the requirement include the lognormal and the Gompertz (for certain parameter values), among several others.
9 Irreversibility yields no advantages but implies some costs that arise because the firm cannot recoup its investment if conditions turn out to be adverse, which creates the asymmetry that the firm cares about adverse events (which would not be regrettable were investment reversible) but not favorable ones.
the bad news). Hence, waiting allows it to avoid making a negative payoff with probability . ) ( dt t e  10 Overall, total marginal value is equal to: Note from the second term that waiting allows the firm to update its beliefs about the maturity date in a Bayesian fashion. By delaying entry, the firm benefits from learning what some events cannot be (via the denominator of the hazard rate; see its definition), thus allowing for a better assessment of the probabilities of still-not-occurred-events.
11 At the same time, waiting implies that the firm faces a different ex ante probability of the market immediately reaching its maturity (via the numerator of the hazard rate).
IMPACT OF GREATER UNCERTAINTY ON ENTRY TIMING
One of the standard predictions of real options models is that higher uncertainty delays the optimal time of investment. There are some exceptions in certain contexts, though, as for example in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 370-372) .
We now show that the effect on investment timing of a greater spread is ambiguous when the payoff to the firm crucially depends on the unknown arrival time of an 10 By Lemma 1, the payoff if the firm invests at date t is negative if demand suddenly decays .
(which always holds, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1).
11 The reason being that conditioning reduces the outcome space, which enhances the firm's information set.
This contrasts with Roberts' and Weitzman's (1981) model of staged investment, in which the value of a project is also unknown to the company but the firm can reduce uncertainty by going ahead in a sequential fashion. In our stylized model, unlike theirs, information gathering does not require an earlier investment.
Rather, it requires waiting for information to arrive. unfavorable event. In particular, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for a meanpreserving increase in the spread (MPIS) to shorten the optimal time of entry whenever
Since we are to compare members of a family of distribution functions based on (small) differences in the spread, with the restriction that their means be the same, we assume for the remainder of the paper that the density can be parameterized by 2  , i.e.,
).
 is a parameter of increasing risk, so we will usually call it the variance of the random variable. As a result, the hazard rate is also a function of 2  , ), ( 2   t and, for convenience, we assume that it is differentiable in both arguments, denoting partial derivatives by subscripts. Lastly, notice that Hence, an MPIS has two distinct effects on optimal investment timing. On the one hand, it has an impact on the unconditional probability of immediate decay after investing,
At an intuitive level, the firm tends to speed up entry if the MPIS decreases the (ex ante) probability of making losses immediately after investing. On the other hand, there is an additional impact on the probability that the firm does not end up investing because of a low realization of ,
Intuitively, the firm is more inclined to hasten investment if the probability of a high realization that would allow it to enter increases. 
IMPACT OF GREATER UNCERTAINTY ON OPTION VALUES
Traditional real options theory predicts that an increase in uncertainty does not harm the value of a firm's investment opportunity (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Chapters 5, 6, or Trigeorgis 1996, Chapters 4, 7, 11). We next study conditions under which this may not happen in our setting. More precisely, we perform a comparative static analysis of the impact of an MPIS on the value of the investment opportunity. 
. Given that the density function can be parameterized by , 2  the threshold that optimally triggers immediate investment at date 0 is also a function of :
As a result, the maximal value of the investment opportunity as a function of both  and 2  is as follows: 
As readily seen from this expression, comparative statics are slightly complicated, for the value of the investment opportunity is a piecewise differentiable function of  , and the non-differentiability point e  depends on . It is this fact that makes the results differ from conventional setups, noting that the envelope theorem implies that a change in e t due to the MPIS has a negligible effect on the firm's maximal payoff. In particular, the outcome space coincides with that of t, which allows the discontinuity to appear. The firm does not invest when its worst-scenario payoff is 0 (the only way to prevent the discontinuity from arising), but rather when its expected payoff is maximal, that is, at . indeed. In such a case, the probability of the market maturity date occurring at some date between e t 0 and max t (and thus the probability of making losses) may increase so much so as to destroy part of the value of the option to invest.
16 See Tirole (1988, p. 397, exercise 10.6) or Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 198, expressions 6.D.1 and 6.D.2).
Continuing with the example of Section 4, we next provide a numerical illustration that greater uncertainty harms option values. Since a gamma distribution has
if and only if its hazard rate is decreasing, we have the results depicted in Table 2 . 
 

CONCLUSION
This paper has focused on investment contexts in which the only source of uncertainty affecting the value of a project stems from the unknown date of arrival of an unfavorable event. We have not modeled uncertainty over time by the means of a full-fledged stochastic process, and we have assumed under fairly general conditions that the date of occurrence of the event is a single random variable. In particular, it need not be exponentially distributed, which would rule out Poisson processes, since they are not well suited for certain analyses.
The consideration of unknown-date events as a source of uncertainty dramatically affects some of the core conclusions that characterize conventional real options theory.
More specifically, we have identified a necessary and sufficient condition for the value of an investment opportunity to decrease with uncertainty. This would occur because the time space -which is the control space-and the outcome space -which is the state spacecoincide. Consequently, waiting allows the firm to be insured against adverse states of the world while taking advantage of favorable states. The firm cannot avoid being damaged (and thus making losses) if the adverse event occurs shortly after investing, though. The reason is that the firm chooses to invest when expected net present value is maximal, not when downside risk vanishes, and thus greater uncertainty may increase the probability of occurrence of the adverse event right after investing by a sufficiently large amount.
In addition, we have shown that greater uncertainty may speed up entry timing in certain situations. Pinpointing the conditions under which this occurs is certainly relevant for empirical work on the investment-uncertainty relationship. In our model, the firm
anticipates that it will have better information at the time of investment, so at the margin, it only cares about the conditional probability of immediate arrival of the unfavorable event.
Greater uncertainty may reduce this probability of receiving bad news, thus decreasing the cost of making an irreversible investment, which would hasten entry. Intuitively, the firm would face a smaller (ex ante) probability of making losses immediately after investing and/or a larger probability of being able to invest because of favorable market conditions.
Lastly, we have set up an alternative theoretical framework for continuous-time real options models of investment whenever the demand of a product follows a life cycle that is unknown to the firm. 17 The setting is simpler than that proposed by Bollen (1999) , and is a potentially useful building block for issues that we do not deal with, such as the option to add or contract capacity, 18 R&D investment opportunities that open up the option to enter new markets that are expected to evolve as the one described, or game-theoretic setups. 
APPENDIX
Differentiating with respect to 1 t and performing some algebraic manipulations yields:
Otherwise, we would reach a contradiction:
for . 
is a decreasing function in order to prove that a unique global maximum is attained at
The assumption that ) ( 
Hence, differentiating yields: 
